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Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA) was
enacted in an effort to require federal
agencies to evaluate and consider the
environmental impact of their actions.'
A few years later, Congress enacted
the Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA) which requires the listing of
endangered or threatened species, and
the protection of their habitats.'
These two federal acts conflict
regarding the Secretary of the
Interior's duty when preparing an
Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) as required by NEPA, and his
duty when designating a critical
habitat area as required by ESA.
Recently, the Tenth Circuit analyzed
the question raised by this conflict and
ordered the Secretary to comply with
NEPA when designating a critical
habitat.4
The Tenth Circuit incorrectly
answered the conflict for several
reasons. First, the requirements of
NEPA and ESA are "functionally
equivalent," and therefore do not need
to be complied with simultaneously.
Second, federal courts must uphold a
federal agency's decision unless that
reason was unreasonable,' and in the
instant case, the Secretary's decision
was reasonable. Third, NEPA was
designed to 'give way' to conflicting
statutes, while ESA was not.' Hence,
in the conflict raised in the instant
case, ESA trumps NEPA. Fourth,
congressional silence on this issue
should be interpreted to be approval
of the Secretary's procedures. Notice
published in the Federal Register, prior
Secretarial action, case law, and the
opinion of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality all presented opportu-
nities for Congress to express its
disagreement with the Secretary's
decision.' Congress did not express
disagreement. Congressional silence
suggests that the Secretary is follow-
ing ESA as Congress intended.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Plaintiff-Appellee,
Catron County Board of Commission-
ers (County), filed suit against the
United States Fish and Wildlife
Service, the Secretary of the Interior,"
and various other governmental
officials'. Appellee alleged the
Defendants-Appellants (Secretary) did
not comply with the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)o when the Secretary desig-
nated certain lands' as critical
habitat.12 The County sought injunc-
tive relief to prevent the Secretary
from implementing and enforcing the
designation of critical habitat." The
Secretary sought to have designated
certain land as critical habitat which is
home to the spikedace and the loach
minnow, both threatened species
under the ESA.'" The proposed
critical habitat acreage included 74
miles of river habitat located within
Catron County, New Mexico. Much
of the land encompassing the river
habitat is actually owned by the
'75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996).
21969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751.
'1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807.
"Catron County Board of Commissioners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife, 75 F.3d 1429, 1432 (9 Cir. 1996).
5Foundation for North American Wild Sheep v. United States Department of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9' Cir. 1982).
6See infra note 185.
'See Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1504 (91hCir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996), and reh'g denied, 116 S. Ct.
1292 (1996). See also Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1438.
"Bruce Babbitt.
9Richard Smith, Acting Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; John Rogers, Regional Director of Region 2 of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service; and Sam Spiller, Field Supervisor, Region 2, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
1oCatron County, 75 F.3d at 1429.
"Id. at 1432. The proposed designation constituted nearly 74 miles of river habitat located within the County.
12ld. Concurrent with his determination that a species is endangered or threatened, the Secretary is required to designate any habitat of
such species to be a critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (a)(3)(A). It is within the Secretary's discretion to exclude any area from critical
habitat, unless he determines that such exclusion will result in the extinction of the endangered or threaten species. I U.S.C. §
1533(b)(2). The result of a designation of a critical habitat is that any action authorized, funded or carried out by a Federal agency may
not destroy or modify the critical habitat of any endangered or threatened species. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 9457.
"Carron County,75 F.3d at 1432. The County initially filed suit in June 1993. In April 1994 the County filed its motion for injunctive
relief.
141d. See, 51 Fed.Reg. 23,769 (spikedace); 39,468 (loach minnow) (1986).
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County." The County alleged the
designation of its land as critical
habitat would cause it injury because
that would prevent the County's
efforts at the diversion and impound-
ment of water supplied by the river."'
Without such control over the river,
the likely result would be flood
damage to county-owned property,
including the fairgrounds, roads and
bridges." Additionally, such flood
damage would injure the local
economy." The County sought to
have the Secretary comply with NEPA
and perform an EIS to avoid the risk
of "real environmental harm .. .
through inadequate foresight and
deliberation.""
In 1986, the Secretary
adopted final regulations listing the
spikedace and loach minnow as
endangered species, as required by
ESA.20 Concurrently with that listing,
the Secretary extended the deadline
for the final designation of the critical
habitat." The designation of critical
habitat subsequently became effective
in April 1994.2 In the Secretary's
initial proposal listing of the endan-
gered species in this case, he asserted
he was "not required to comply with
the documentation requirements of
NEPA, claiming that Secretarial
actions under § 1533 of the Endan-
gered Species Act . .. are exempt
from NEPA as a matter of law.""
The United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico
held that the Secretary failed to
comply with NEPA requirements in
designating certain lands as critical
habitat.24 On appeal, the Secretary
sought reversal of the district court's
finding that he must comply with
NEPA 5 and prepare an EIS." The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court decision."
The Tenth Circuit held that when
designating critical habitat under the
ESA, and when such designation
constitutes major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, the Secretary of
the Interior must comply with NEPA





protection of endangered species was
originally enacted as the Endangered
Species Preservation Act of 1966.9
That particular statute was repealed by
the Endangered Species Act of 1973.1"
The 1973 Act" remains in force today,
yet has been amended five times. 2
Essentially, the current Endangered
Species Act (ESA) provides for: the
management, conservation, and
recovery of endangered and threat-
ened species of fish and wildlife. The
Act provides for the listing by the
Secretaries of Commerce and the
Interior of threatened and endangered
species of flora and fauna, prohibits
certain activities involving such
species, establishes a permitting
system, and provides for enforcement
measures.3
Section 5 of ESA34 embodies
"sCatron County, 75 F.3d at 1429, 1438. The opinion is not clear concerning the number of affected acres owned by the County.
'ld. at 1433.
"Id. at 1429, 1437-1438.
'"Id. at 1437-1438.
19Id. at 1433.
2 ld. at 1432.
2
'ld.
21d. The opinion does not state the reason for the eight year delay.
231d.
14Id. The district court also granted the County's motion for injunctive relief, however, the order was stayed pending the outcome of the
appeal.
251d. at 1433.
lid. at 1433, 1434. The issue of standing was also raised by defendants. The appellate court found plaintiffs had standing based on the
following:
1. Injury in fact was shown by plaintiffs in their assertion that their property could be threatened by flood damage if the designation was
made;
2. Causal link was found between the plaintiff's likely injury and the conduct complained of;
3. Redressability was met by a showing of a "substantial likelihood" that compliance with NEPA by the Secretary would redress the
claimed injuries; and
4. In that NEPA does not provide for a private cause of action, plaintiff had standing when suing under the APA. Id. at 1433, 1434.
271d. at 1432.
11Id. at 1439.
"I973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990.
mid. at 2989.
316 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
nrThe amendments occurred in 1976, 1978, 1979, 1982, and 1988.
13l982 U.S.C.C.A.N 2807.
'16 U.S.C. § 1533.
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the procedures to be followed when
listing a species as endangered or
threatened. This section also grants
the Secretary of the Interior the power
to designate an area as a critical
habitat." Legislative history regarding
§ 5 states that the "Secretary [has]
broad authority to acquire any real
property ... which he finds necessary
for the purpose of conserving,
protecting, restoring, or propagating
any endangered or threatened spe-
ciCs."^' Similarly, the purpose of the
Act was to provide an effective means
to conserve, protect, and restore the
ecosystems upon which endangered or
threatened species depend for sur-
vival." Under ESA, the definition of
critical habitat includes "air, land or
water areas ... only if their loss would
significantly decrease the likelihood of
conserving the species in question.""
Congress has directed that
all agencies of the federal government
are to cooperate in the implementation
of the goals of ESA concerning
conservation, protection, and restora-
tion of designated ecosystems." In
this pursuit, federal agencies are
required to take steps to make certain
that actions authorized by it do not
harm a listed species or the species'
designated critical habitat."c
During discussion of the
1973 amendment of the ESA, the
Committee which reviewed the
proposed amendments reiterated that
the power of acquiring a critical
habitat is imperative for ESA to be
effective.' The Act, therefore, must
vest adequate authority in the Secre-
tary to acquire such habitat. 42
The 1978 proposed amend-
ments to ESA sought, inter alia, to
introduce flexibility into the Act43 by
adding a provision to allow an
exemption from the requirements of §
7.4 The exemption allows non-
compliance with § 7 if a federal
agency can show that there are no
reasonable and prudent alternatives to
the agency's project. The proposed
exemption has been adopted and is
now incorporated at ESA § 7(g).1
The committee report of the
1978 amendments stated that the
exemption which may be granted
under § 7(g) is not a major federal
action for the purposes of NEPA "if an
environmental impact statement which
discusses impacts on endangered or
threatened species or their critical
habitats has been prepared.""
Federal legislation for general
protection of the environment was
enacted by Congress with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)." The purpose of NEPA was
to obtain "broad and independent"
overviews of the quality of the natural
environment,' and to suggest mea-
sures to improve the environmental
situation.') NEPA requires reporting
of such overviews to Congress and to
the general public with recommenda-
tions on steps which can be taken to
improve the quality of the environ-
ment." NEPA provisions are to be
complied with "to the fullest extent
possible."" NEPA "requires any
federal agency proposing a 'major
Federal action significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment'
to prepare what is known as an
Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS)." 3
When proposed and adopted,
NEPA was met with little opposition.
The House Committee recognized that
environmental concerns significantly
effect the public's everyday life, and
sought to establish a system to require
an independent review of the interre-
351d.
1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2994.
71d. at 2995.
311978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, at 9475.





"Section 7 of the ESA (as amended in 1978), "requires Federal agencies to insure that any action authorized ... by them does not
jeopardize the continued existence of listed species ordestroy or adversely modify the critical habitat of any endangered or threatened
species." 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2557, 2561.
4'1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9464.
"In 1982, ESA was amended with the intent to make the Act a more effective and efficient tool for the conservation of endangered or
threatened species. In 1982, Congress did consider other revisions to § 7(a) of ESA, yet did not change the substantive duty of §
7(a)(2). See, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2824.
47l978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9490.




s242 U.S.C. § 4332.
"Carron County, 75 F.3d at 1434.
-1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2752-2753.
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lated problems associated with
environmental quality and federal
actions." The goal was to "reverse
what seems to be a clear and intensify-
ing trend toward environmental
degradation."'
As reported by the Commit-
tee, testimony at the hearings reflected
the bel ief that the council established
by NEPA would not conflict with the
previously established interdepartmen-
tal council, which included the
Secretary of the Interior." The
committee report also stated it was
"well aware that the problems with
which this legislation attempts to deal
are long term, and that not all eventu-
alities ... are foreseeable."s" A
requirement to make studies and
recommendations relating to env iron-
mental considerations should therefore
allow adaption to changing circum-
stances (emphasis added).s9
For "major Federal Actions
significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment," NEPA mandates
the preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS)." The EIS
must include a detailed statement
concerning any adverse environmental
effects which cannot be avoided
should a proposal be implemented,
and must include alternatives to the
proposed action.'
In 1975, a Senate committee
sought to clarify the procedures
required by NEPA in the preparation
of EISs.6' Specifically, there was
uncertainty of whether federal
agencies could delegate EIS prepara-
tion duties to consultants and to state
governments.1 The purpose of the
proposed amendment to NEPA was to
remedy procedural difficulties arising
from a decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,' and
subsequent rulings.' Rulings in those
cases held that "NEPA requires full
and independent preparation of all
EIS's (sic) by the federal agency.""
The amendment permits state prepara-
tion of an EIS as long as the federal
agency also participated in the
preparation and evaluation of the EIS
project." This legislative response
was appropriate, the Senate commit-
tee believed, because the judicial
interpretation potentially exposed
NEPA to criticism which could lead to
an erosion of the statute's strength."
B. Judicial History
Only one year prior to the
decision in Catron County, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on a
similar case." The issue in that case
also was whether NEPA applies to the
designation of a critical habitat under
ESA." The Ninth Circuit held that it
does not."
Similar to the instant case,
plaintiffs in Douglas County sued the
Secretary of the Interior alleging
failure to comply with the require-
ments of NEPA in its designation of
certain federal land as critical habitat.'2
The Secretary argued that ESA
procedures supplant NEPA proce-
dures, and hence, NEPA does not
apply to designations of critical
habitat." Parties submitting amicus
briefs argued that requiring an EIS
would "frustrate the purposes of both
NEPA and the ESA." 4
The Ninth Circuit, convinced
by NEPA's legislative history, con-
cluded that the "ESA procedures for
designating a critical habitat replace
the NEPA requirements"" The court
noted that Congress provided a
procedure for the designation of a
critical habitat in the 1978 amend-
ments to ESA." The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the changes to ESA
s51d. at 2753.
mld.
"The interdepartmental Environmental Quality Council, created by Executive Order No. 11472, dated May 29, 1969 was a body which
included the Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 2754.
"Id. at 2760.
"Id.
-42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
6"42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii), (iii).
621975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 859.
Old. at. 859, 861.
"Conservation Society v. Secretary, 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
'Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105, (D.N.H. 1975); and Swain v. Brinegar, 542 F. 2d 364 (7th Cir. 1975).
6l975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 860.
67Id.
"Id. at 864.







75Carron County, 75 F.3d at 1503.
'The 1978 ESA amendments were made eight years after the enactment of NEPA, implying that Congress was well aware of NEPA
requirements. These amendments to ESA allowed for the consideration of economic impact of a designation
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made NEPA requirements seem
superfluous and hence displaced
NEPA's informational requirements."
The Douglas County court
also concluded that ESA conflicts
with NEPA in that ESA allows the
Secretary to exclude from critical
habitat any area which the benefit of
exclusion outweighs the harm which
would be caused by inclusion, yet
NEPA mandates the Secretary to
include all areas without which a
species would become extinct, and the
Secretary may not consider the
environmental impact of such designa-
tion." The Ninth Circuit, therefore,
interpreted the NEPA mandate to be in
direct conflict with the requirements
of ESA.19
In Douglas County, the court
concluded that Congress made an
"implicit choice to accept the
Secretary's policy not to prepare EISs
when designating critical habitats.""
The court reasoned that evidence of
this choice was present in the 1988
Amendments to ESA.' Those
amendments did not change the
critical habitat provision, hence the
court concluded that Congress had
accepted the Secretary's interpretation
of ESA.2
Also to support its decision,
the Douglas County court looked to
precedent. A 1981 case" held that
when listing a species as endangered
or threatened, the Secretary did not
have to comply with NEPA.K4 Be-
cause of the similarity in the process,
the Douglas County court reasoned
that when designating a critical habitat
compliance with NEPA was not
required by ESA.
Next, the Ninth Circuit
looked to the Federal Register to
analyze Congressional intent." In
1983, the Secretary "announced in
the Federal Register his decision not
to prepare an Environmental Assess-
ment 6 (and therefore the subsequent
EIS) before making critical habitat
designations."" The court noted that
when Congress considered ESA
amendments in 1988, however, no
response was made to the Secretary's
1983 announcement.' Because
Congress was silent, the Ninth Circuit
concluded this was persuasive
evidence that the Secretary's interpre-
tation was the one Congress in-
tended."
The Ninth Circuit also found
that the goals of designating a critical
habitat under ESA and the documen-
tation requirements of NEPA are
similar enough so that both are not
required simultaneously."' The court
held the similarities of NEPA's and
ESA's purposes are evident by their
language. NEPA's purpose is to
"promote human welfare by alerting
governmental actors to the effect of
their proposed actions on the physical
environment"9' and to protect the
environment from further damage.2
ESA's purpose is to designate critical
habitats for endangered species for the
preservation of the environment and
to "prevent the irretrievable loss of a
natural resource."' The court thus
found that the designation of a critical
habitat under ESA advances the
purpose of NEPA and may therefore it
may not be necessary to comply with
both Acts.94
The Ninth Circuit then
looked to the language of the Act
itself. NEPA language requires all
federal agencies to comply with NEPA
"to the fullest extent possible."' Case
and required the Secretary to provide notice to residents in the affected area. Congressional records indicate that the committee wished
to add flexibility to the requirements of the ESA regarding the procedures required for designating a critical habitat. Id. at 1503. See,
H.R.Rep. No. 1625,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9464.
"Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1503.
'11d. See, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).




8 3Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 657 F2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1981).
"Dicta in Pacific Legal Foundation suggested that designation of a critical habitat under ESA might be the 'functional equivalent' of
procedures required by an EIS under NEPA. See Douglas County. 48 F.3d at 1504.
"Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504.
6"For proposed actions the environmental effects of which are uncertain, the agency must prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA)
to determine whether a significant effect will result from the proposed action. Based upon the EA, the agency must either make a
'finding of no significant impact' (FONSI) or determine if a significant environmental impact will result, thus requiring the preparation
of an EIS." Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1434, citations omitted.
"48 Fed.Reg. 49,244 (1983).
"Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504.
91d.
'*ld. at 1506.
91Id. (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772 (1983)).
9 1d. at 1506.
931d. (citing Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 837).
9Id..
9 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
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law had interpreted this language to
mean that "NEPA was not intended to
repeal by implication any other
statute."' A House conference
committee report7 stated that NEPA
applies unless "the existing law
applicable to such agency's operations
expressly prohibits or makes full
compliance with one of the directives
impossible.'" Because of this
language, the Ninth Circuit was
convinced that "Congress intended
that the ESA procedures for designat-
ing a critical habitat replace the NEPA
requirements.""
In sum, the Douglas County
court found that the Secretary was not
required to comply with NEPA when
designating a habitat under ESA
"because (1) Congress intended that
the ESA critical habitat procedures
displace the NEPA requirements,....
and (3) to apply NEPA to the ESA
would further the purpose of neither
statute."Ico
The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit"o' considered a
similar issue when the question before
it was whether a federal agency must
comply with NEPA in filing an EIS
before listing a species as endangered.
In Pacific Legal Foundation v.
Andrus. decided in 1981, the Sixth
Circuit held that NEPA's requirement
to file an EIS conflicts with ESA,
therefore NEPA must give way."'2
Hence, the Fish and Wildlife Service
was not required to comply with
NEPA before listing certain species as
endangered.""
The Sixth Circuit supported
its holding by first noting that the
filing of an EIS does not serve the
purposes of ESA."' Because the
Secretary is required by ESA to list a
species as endangered or threatened
based on five factors,"' while NEPA
does not vest discretion in the
Secretary to consider those factors,
the court found that NEPA merely
supplemented the existing goals of
ESA.1"')
The court then held that the
Secretary's listing of a species as
endangered or threatened "furthers the
purposes of NEPA even though no
impact statement is filed.""" The
court noted that NEPA was designed
to establish a national policy which
would encourage harmony between
man and his environment, to curtail
damage to the environment, to enlarge
man's knowledge of ecological
systems and natural resources, and to
provide the mechanism for accom-
plishing these goals."' Similarly, when
the Secretary lists species as endan-
gered under authority provided him by
the ESA, he too is working to
preserve the environment, and he
"enhances the ability to learn about the
ecosystems.""" Hence, to require the
Secretary to file an impact statement
would only hinder his efforts under the
ESA, yet when the Secretary acts
within the mandates of the ESA, he
also accomplished the goals of
NEPA.'"'
Additionally, the Court noted
that the Supreme Court has previously
held that NEPA was not intended to
'Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1502 (citing Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d at 779).
'Reprinted at 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2770.
"Douglas County, 48 F3d at 1502.
991d. at 1503.
'id. at 1507-1508.
'o'Perhaps it should be noted from the outset that the Sixth Circuit seems to hold ill feelings toward NEPA, as evidenced by its statement
in this decision that "[tihis Court is reluctant to make NEPA more of an obstructionist tactic to prevent environment-enhancing action
that it may already have become." Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 838.
ImPacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 838.
'"Id. at 829, 835. Note that this case focused on a federal agency's listing of a species as endangered, and not the subsequent act of
designating a critical habitat. The opinion noted, however, that at the time of the alleged violation of NEPA in this case, "once the listing
was made, all federal agencies were to consult with the Secretary and insure their actions did not jeopardize the existence of an endan-
gered species or result in the destruction or modification of the habitat of such species." Id. at 829.
""Id. at 835.
""The five factors are listed at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(1) (1974) and are as follows:
(1) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range;
(2) overutilization for commercial, sporting, scientific or educational purposes;
(3) disease or predation;
(4) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(5) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.






override or repeal other statutes."'
Pointing out that NEPA is to be
complied with "to the fullest extent
possible,""' the Court stated that this
language is not a loophole, but a
directive that all agencies are to
comply with NEPA, "unless there is a
statutory conflict with the agency's
authorizing legislation that expressly
prohibits or makes full compliance
impossible.""'
The Sixth Circuit also
supported its holding by stating that
the filing of an EIS would not serve
the purposes for which it is required,
namely to insure that a federal agency
considers the impact of its actions.I4
The Secretary is required under the
ESA to make his findings based on the
best scientific data available, yet for
the EIS required by NEPA the
Secretary has "no authority to
consider environmental factors,""'
therefore, preparation of an EIS
regarding listing of an endangered
species is "a waste of time.""'
The Sixth Circuit interpreted
NEPA's legislative history to suggest
that "NEPA was not intended to be
applied to agencies whose function
was to protect the environment.""'
The Conference Report of the 1969
hearings on enactment of NEPA
evidence that provisions of NEPA
were not designed to cause a change
in the manner in which environment-
enhancement agencies carry out their
protection authority."' Thus, the
court concluded, Congress did not
intend to require the Secretary to file
an EIS before listing a species as
threatened or endangered."
The Sixth Circuit, however,
specifically left open the question of
whether, after the 1978 Amendment to
ESA, the ESA may provide the
functional equivalent of an impact
statement when designating a critical
habitat as required by ESA.o
Courts have often interpreted
legislative intent to require all federal
agencies to comply with the directives
set out in NEPA."' A limitation was
set, however, by the U.S. Supreme
Court when it held that the language
of NEPA "was not intended to repeal
by implication any other statute." 2 2
Rather, all federal agencies are
required under NEPA to review their
policies and procedures to determine
whether there are any deficiencies or
inconsistencies which would prohibit
full compliance with the purposes and
provisions of NEPA. 2 1 If Congress
has designated a procedure that differs
materially from procedures required by
NEPA,"'^ then the federal agency need
not comply with NEPA. This "material
difference" has been characterized as
an irreconcilable or fundamental
conflict between NEPA and the federal
agency's authority."' Therefore, case
law supports the conclusion that
NEPA requirements must be met,
unless the "obligations of another
statute are clearly mutually exclusive
with the mandates of NEPA."s
Other courts have focused
on the reasonableness of an agency's
decision. These decisions have cited
NEPA's provision at § 4332 for
support that an agency decision
specifically not to prepare an EIS must
be upheld by the federal courts, unless
the agency's decision is unreason-
able.2 7 An agency decision which is
fully informed and well-considered
may not be overruled by the federal
courts substituting their judgment for
the agency's. 2 1 An elaboration on this
standard was stated by the District
Court of Tennessee which held:
An agency determination
whether or not to prepare an
EIS is reviewable under a
"reasonableness" standard.
The court is to review the
administrative records as well
as other evidence to deter-
mine whether the agency
adequately considered the
values set out in NEPA and
"'Id. at 836 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,548 (1978), and
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 692-94 (1973)).
11242 U.S.C. § 4332(2).











'Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn., 426 U.S. 776, 788 (10th Cir. 1976).
"
2 United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 694.
231d.
'1 4Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1986).
25Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn., 426 U.S. at 788.
"
6Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 598 (10th Cir. 1972).
'Foundation for North American Wild Sheep v. United States Department of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982).
2




effects of the project before
the agency reaches its
decision on whether an EIS
was necessary. If the agency
engaged in this analysis and
reasonably concluded that no
EIS was required, that
decision will be upheld.'"
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding that the
Secretary of Interior did fail to comply
with NEPA as required when he
designated certain lands within Catron
County as critical habitat.""
The appellate court first
looked to relevant precedent on the
issue and specifically examined cases
where compliance with NEPA is
excused when there is a statutory
conflict between the agency's
authorizing legislation and the
requirements of NEPA.1' The
appellate court noted that "conflict"
has been found in instances where
compliance with both statutes is
impossible."' First, when compliance
with NEPA and another statute is
impossible, "NEPA must give way.""'
Compliance with NEPA is only to the
"fullest extent possibic,"'" and is not
intended to repeal any other statute."'
Second, the court noted that
compliance with NEPA has also been
excused where requirements in the
statutes would essentially result in
duplication, "rendering compliance
with both superfluous."' This
exception to NEPA has often been
referred to as the "functional equiva-
lent" test.'' Where the particular
action being taken by the Secretary is
subject to rules and regulations that in
essence duplicate the NEPA rules and
regulations, NEPA must give way.'
In the instant decision,
however, the appellate court did not
find either of the above exceptions
applicable."' The court looked to the
focus of the ESA critical habitat
designation, and did not find the
obligations of both ESA and NEPA to
be functionally equivalent or in
conflict.''
The appellate court found
that the ESA requirements only
partially fulfilled NEPA's requirements,
and that partial fulfillment is not
satisfactory."' The court noted that
the purposes of ESA and NEPA are
not identical.14 2 ESA's core purpose is
the protection of endangered or
threaten species."' NEPA however, is
a procedural statute for the purpose of
informing governmental agencies of
the possible environmental results of
their actions.'" The court stated that
if it were to interpret NEPA "as
merely requiring an assessment of
detrimental impacts upon the environ-
ment," such interpretation would
diminish the purpose of the Act to
inform governmental officials of the
"Ocoee River Council v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 540 F. Supp. 788, 795 (D.C. Tenn., 1981).
"Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1432.
"'Ild. at 1435.
"Id..
"Id. (quoting from Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 788).
42 U.S.C. § 4332.
'See infra note 185.
'"Catron County, 75 E3d at 1435.
'RId. at 1435. See also Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 834 (providing citations to cases where a functional equivalent has been
found). Some cases have held that for the functional equivalent test to be met, all elements must be required by each statute. Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 E2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Other cases have held that all elements do not have to be
satisfied by each statute. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Criteria required to meet the functional
equivalent test has been stated as follows:
The functional equivalent exemption developed in common law for situations where an agency achieves NEPA's objective of full
disclosure of environmental effects through means comparable to an EIS. In general, under the functional equivalent exception, an
agency with expertise in environmental matters is not obligated to comply with the formal EIS process prior to taking a particular
action, if two criteria are met. First, the agency's authorizing statute must provide 'substantive and procedural standards [that]
ensure full and adequate consideration of environmental issues.' (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247,
1257.) Second, the agency must afford an opportunity for public participation in the evaluation of environmental factors prior to
arriving at a final decision.
APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 102(2)(c) OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROrEcTION ACT OF 1969 To RESPONSE ACrlONS UNDER SECTION 104
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY AcT OF 1980. September 1, 1982, 1982 WL 45416, *4.
'3sCatron County, 75 F.3d at 1435 (citing Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 788-91, quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973)).
"See Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1438.







results of their actions."' Finally, the
appellate court stated that the goals of
ESA will be furthered by compliance
with NEPA.'4
In sum, the appellate court
held that because the requirements of
NEPA and ESA were not mutually
exclusive, nor duplicative, and because
compliance with one would further the
goals of the other, the Secretary must
comply with NEPA by preparing an
EIS when designating critical habitat
under ESA.'
The court also considered the
Secretary's argument that Congres-
sional silence on the matter should be
interpreted as endorsement of the
Secretary's actions." The court
acknowledged that when Congress
revisits a statute, yet does not revise
or repeal the statute, that is persuasive
evidence that Congress endorses the
interpretation of the statute. 49 The
court noted that in this case there was
no evidence of congressional aware-
ness of the interpretation given to
NEPA's impact statements with regard
to ESA.'1" The court concluded that
the legislative history, including
Congressional silence, did not
"indicate congressional endorsement
of the Secretary's" interpretation of
NEPA when designating critical
habitats.'
The appellate court did
acknowledge that other circuits have
ruled differently on this issue by
holding that the Secretary need not
comply with NEPA's documentation
requirements.' However, the Tenth
Circuit Court found that in light of
precedent in its circuit, and a careful
analysis of the facts, the Secretary
must comply with NEPA and prepare
an EIS when designating a critical
habitat. 3'
V. COMMENT
The Tenth Circuit in Catron
County incorrectly decided that the
Secretary must comply with NEPA for
several reasons.
First, the procedures
involved in preparation of an EIS and
in designating a critical habitat under
ESA are 'functionally equivalent,' or
duplicative, and therefore not re-
quired. NEPA requires federal
agencies proposing a major federal
action to prepare an EIS. The primary
purposes of an EIS are: (1) to
consider environmental impact of the
action; (2) to inform the public; and
(3) to enable those outside the agency
to evaluate the agency's actions.'s In
the critical habitat designation
required of ESA, the Secretary must
use the best scientific and commercial
data available, consider economic and
any other relevant impact of the
action, notify the public of the
proposed action, and allow for public
comment.'
The purposes and require-
ments of these two provisions are
similar enough to be functionally
equivalent. Essentially, the functional
equivalent argument'" is that steps
required by one process are similar to
the steps required for another pro-
cess.'"I Therefore, to answer the
question of whether the designation of
a critical habitat and the preparation of
an EIS are functionally equivalent, the
steps for each must be considered.
The first relevant provision
of ESA is § 5,' wherein the Secretary
is directed to designate species as
endangered or threatened when
certain criteria are met, and simulta-
neously designate any habitat which is
considered to be critical habitat for
such species.'"9 After consideration of
the impact of the critical habitat
designation, the Secretary may
exclude an area from critical habitat
only if he concludes that it is more
beneficial than harmful to make such
exclusion." However, if the Secre-
tary concludes it is more beneficial to
exclude an area, he still must designate
it as critical habitat if not doing so
would result in the extinction of the
listed species.'"' Section 5 of the ESA




1"Id. at 1438. The Secretary based his argument in this regard on four facts: (I) that the Sixth Circuit ruling in Pacific Legal Founda-
tion excluded compliance with NEPA in designating a critical habitat, (2) that the CEQ issued a letter in 1983 which indicating that the
Secretary need not preparing NEPA impact statements when listing a species as endangered, (3) that in 1983 the Secretary announced in
the Federal Register "his intention not to pre -PA impact statements in connection with regulations promulgated under § 1533(a)
of ESA," and, (4) that during the 1988 ES/ mend nt hearings Congress did not "revise or repeal" any of the judicial and executive




'See Douglas County, 484 F.3d at 1495. See also Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 829.
'"Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1436.
'"Id. at 1434.
'"Id. at 1434, 1435.
'"Supra, note 154.
'Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504 n. 10.
'"16 U.S.C. § 1533.
'"16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
1-016 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
1''Id.
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Secretary when designating a critical
habitat.'^' "Congress has not given
the Secretary discretion to consider
environmental factors other than those
relating directly to preservation of
species."'"
The second relevant require-
ment under ESA § 5 is notice. When
the Secretary designates a critical
habitat, he must give notice of his
proposal to government officials and
to the public near the area to be
designated, and invite comment on his
proposal.'" If any person requests to
comment on the proposed action, a
hearing must be held promptly.'65 The
Secretary must publish the complete
text of his proposed designation in the
Federal Register within 90 days before
the effective date of the designation. '
Actual notice, however, must be given
to the appropriate State agency."
Examination of the other
relevant statute, NEPA, is also
required. Procedures required by
NEPA are drafted to insure that
environmental consequences are
considered in decision-making by
federal agencies." To assure that this
purpose is met, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-
1508 contains guidelines for preparing
an EIS. A summary of those guide-
lines follows: First, an EIS must
compare the environmental impacts of
the proposed action against the
impacts of alternative action." The
comparisons should be based upon (1)
environmental impacts of alternatives
and of the proposed action, (2) any
unavoidable adverse environmental
effects caused by the implementation
of the proposed action, (3) the
relationship between short-term uses
and the maintenance and enhancement
of long-term productivity of the
environment, and (4) any irreversible
effects on resources which would be
involved by implementation of the
proposal.' This comparison should
result in a clear presentation to enable
the agency and the public to make
informed decisions. Additionally, the
preparing agency shall indicate its
preferred alternative, "unless another
law prohibits the expression of such a
preference." The EIS must also
provide a description of the "environ-
ment of the area to be affected.""'
The CFR also requires that,
to the fullest extent possible, agencies
prepare draft EISs "concurrently with
and integrated with environmental
impact analysis and related surveys
and studies required by ... the Endan-
gered Species Act."" 2 This language
may be interpreted to allow the critical
habitat designation under ESA to be
integrated with NEPA's impact
statement."'
Additionally, the CFR allows
any documentation required by NEPA
to be combined with other agency
documentation "to reduce duplication
and paperwork.""'
As is evident by the term
"guidelines," the guidelines in the CFR
do not require strict application by the
courts. Rather, courts look to the
sufficiency of an EIS by examining the
particular facts and circumstances
surrounding the project and the extent
of detail required which is "necessarily
related to the complexity of the
environmental problems involved.""'
Essentially, what is required
by NEPA is disclosure of any potential
environmental impacts of a major
federal action. Notice procedures
required for designation of a critical
habitat under ESA seem to make the
NEPA procedure redundant and
unnecessary. The "congressional
mandate for public participation in the
designation process, ... displaces
NEPA's procedural and informational
requirements.""'
In sum, the requirements of
ESA for designating a critical habitat
of a listed species, and the require-
ments of NEPA in preparation of an
EIS are so similar as to qualify as
functionally equivalent. When
"See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 for the specific criteria for designating critical habitat.
'
3Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1507 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)).
"16 U.S.C. § 1533(5).
"16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(E) requires the hearing to be held within 45 days after the date of publication of the general notice.
"16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(i).
"'MThe appropriate agency is the "State agency in each State in which the species is believed to occur, and to each county ... in which the
species is believed to occur." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii).
"7 C.F.R. § 650.1(d).
"'40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
1"40 C.P.R. § 1502.16.
"'40 C.RR. § 1502.15.
7240 C.F.R. § 1502.25.
'"This interpretation is suggested by taking the conclusions of Douglas County to their logical end. The court in Douglas County held
that (1) the requirements for designating critical habitat under ESA displaced NEPA, (2) NEPA does not apply to federal acts which do
not alter the physical environment, and (3) that ESA preserves the environment, thereby furthering the goals of NEPA without requiring
an EIS. In sum, these individual premises can come to the result that ESA and NEPA may be integrated in this procedure.
" 40 C.F.R. § 1506.4.
"'Olmsted Citizens for a Better Community v. United States, 606 F.Supp. 964, 974 (D. Minn. 1985) (citing Robinson v. Knebel, 550
F.2d 422, 426 (8th Cir. 1977)).
"Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1503.
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procedures are functionally equiva-
lent, NEPA has given way to other
statutes. This, the "giving way" of
NEPA, is the proper result in the
instant case.
The second reason why the
Tenth Circuit incorrectly decided
Carron County is because federal
courts must uphold a federal agency's
decision unless that decision was
unreasonable. The standard of review
was not mentioned in the Carron
County opinion, yet the standard
should have been as other courts
have established; one of "reasonable-
ness." '7
Case law has supported the
specific proposition that an agency
decision not to prepare an EIS must
be upheld by the federal courts, unless
that decision is unreasonable."' Also,
in several federal circuit courts, it is
established practice that an agency's
decision that other particular proce-
dures do not require preparation of a
EIS will be upheld unless unreason-
able.'
The Secretary's decision in
the instant case appears to have been
reasonable for several reasons. First,
upon the Secretary's determination
that two species inhabiting the area
were endangered, and after public
notice and hearing, the Secretary
designated certain areas in which the
species live as critical habitat. In this
designation, the Secretary was
following previously established
methods and procedures. Second, in
1983 the Secretary had published his
determination that when designating a
critical habitat, he did not need to
prepare an EIS. This decision was
contained in the Federal Register,"'a
and did not draw negative reaction
from Congress. Third, the Secretary
was also relying on a 1983 letter
issued by the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality (CEQ),"' which indicated
that the Secretary no longer needed to
prepare NEPA impact statements
when listing species as threatened or
endangered.'" Fourth, in 1994, when
the Secretary was challenged on a
similar decision, the Sixth Circuit
upheld his decision that it was
unnecessary to comply with NEPA in
designating a critical habitat."I For
each of these reasons, the Secretary's
decision was reasonable and should
have been upheld.
A third reason why the Tenth
Circuit court's decision is in error is
because NEPA was designed to "give
way" to other statutes when they
conflict. NEPA is to be complied with
"to the fullest extent possible,"14 and
this has been interpreted to mean that
the statute was "not intended to repeal
by implication any other statute."'
Because the requirements of NEPA
and ESA in the instant case conflict,
NEPA should be subordinate to the
requirements of ESA.
As explained above, the
process required of the Secretary in
designating critical habitat is redun-
dant of the process required by
NEPA.' 6" Also, the notice and hearing
requirement of ESA is redundant of
NEPA requirements. For these
reasons, both statutes cannot be
complied with simultaneously. The
statute which falls in this case is
NEPA. Therefore, the Secretary
should comply only with the provi-
sions of ESA in designating a critical
habitat.
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit
court's decision was incorrect in its
interpretation of Congressional
silence.'"' When Congress consid-
ered the most recent amendments to
ESA, two factors were present which
presumably gave notice to Congress
of the issue in Catron County.'"x
"'Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1503.
'But see Olmstead Citizens for a Better Community v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 964, 971 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1985) (stating that the
standard of review is "arbitrary and capricious" when reviewing agency action under NEPA).
"Foundation for North American Wild Sheep v. United States Department of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing
Portela v. Pierce, 650 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1981); City and County of San Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir
1980); and (City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975). Also see Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1986).
"'Id. An interesting quandary is presented by the Ninth Circuit in its footnote 24. At that footnote, it states that the appopriate standard
of review for actions of a federal agency mandated by a directive is the "reasonableness" standard. Also, it states that because an EIS
is mandated in certain instances, the reasonableness standard is appropriate when considering a decision not to prepare an EIS. It may
be impossible, therefore, to reconcile the argument that an agency's decision cannot be overturned unless unreasonable with the
position that an EIS is not a mandatory directive.
11o48 Fed.Reg. 49,244-45 (1983).
1148 Fed.Reg. 49,244 (1983).
"
2Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1438.
"Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 835.
1-42 U.S.C. § 4332.
"'Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 836 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 US. 519, 548, and United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 692-94).
'6ESA requires the Secretary to consider economic and other impacts using the best scientific data available, which are also the impacts
of concern to NEPA. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1503.
"Recall that the 1988 amendments to ESA did not include a change to the substantive portion of § 7. Supra, note 46.
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First, the Sixth Circuit held in 1981 that
NEPA did not apply when the
Secretary listed a species as endan-
gered or threatened, and suggested in
dicta that the same result would apply
to a designation of critical habitat.'"
Second, in 1983 the Secretary an-
nounced in the Federal Register his
determination that an EIS was not
necessary in designation of critical
habitats.
Hence, previous case law and
comment in the Federal Register
pointed to the potential conflict
between NEPA and ESA, yet Con-
gress did not act on this interpretation.
It would be expected that Congress
would speak up to the judicial branch
and other legislative agencies if they
were not acting as Congress intended.
Congress did not respond to either
interpretation. Although silence is not
by any means conclusive, a better
argument is made for acceptance than
rejection when silence is the response
to one's statements. Because Con-
gress was silent in this regard, it can
reasonably be inferred that the
Secretary of the Interior was acting in
compliance with congressional intent
when designating critical habitats
according to ESA, while not following
NEPA.
Lastly, NEPA should have
given way in Catron County because
following ESA would lead to a
satisfactory result. This result would
protect the environment because the
Secretary's designation of a critical
habitat functioned as envisioned by the
drafters of the statute. The Secretary
carefully considered the status of the
endangered species, considered
environmental and other impacts of
the designation, published his pro-
posed findings, gave notice, and held
public hearings. To require compli-
ance with NEPA in this situation
would be repetitive, resulting in
nothing more than a waste of money
and time.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Cairon County court
incorrectly decided the issue before it.
The court should have held that NEPA
is superseded by ESA when the
Secretary designates a critical habitat.
While the Catron County decision did
not follow the logic of the Ninth
Circuit in its decision in Douglas
County, the logic expressed in the
latter case is more compelling?
Because ESA requires the
Secretary to list species as endangered
or threatened when certain criteria are
met, and to designate their habitat as
critical, this supplants an EIS require-
ment. The critical habitat designation
already takes into account environ-
mental impact because such designa-
tion must consider the continued
existence of a species and its natural
environment.
While the consideration of
economic and other impacts of federal
action is important, NEPA must be
viewed in a common-sense approach.
To require NEPA to be complied with
when the results of the studies cannot
effect the Secretary's designation of a
critical habitat under the ESA is not
sensible.
'"Carron County, 75 F.3d at 1438.
'"Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504 (citing Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 835).
mandatory directive.
1mWhen circuits are in conflict, it is possible that the issue will be heard by the United States Supreme Court to resolve the conflicting
interpretations among the circuits.
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